

# We need to belong to a non-Cypriot history

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## *Abstract*

The question of why we, the human inhabitants of Cyprus, need to belong to a non-Cypriot history will be discussed. Historical traumas of intra-ethnic political murders and crimes suffered under the two dominant Cypriot identities show the emptiness of the rhetoric of Cypriot fraternity and call forth a non-Cypriot, yet strictly international, political-criminological outlook that can judge the past deeds and incriminate the present sovereign powers. A critical history of non-belonging and non-identity must be developed in order to de-emphasize the significance of national and even post-national "all-too-Cypriot" historiographies and investigate the effects of more global networks such as militarism and capitalism on Cyprus. History needs to be popularized by extending the conspiratorial narrative of Cold War games played in Cyprus into the present era. Cyprus is not a problem to be solved by a semblance of "peaceful co-existence". Cyprus is a crime story to be told and lived in full suspense.

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*History, we don't know. We'll all be dead.*  
George W. Bush

*Anyone can create the future, but only a wise man can create the past.*  
Vladimir Nabokov, *Bend Sinister*

*... history is the privileged place where the gaze becomes unsettled, even if it is only that.*  
Michel de Certeau, 'The Beauty of the Dead: Nisard' in *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*

What follows is a set of philosophical intuitions that will hopefully guide the task of gathering historical facts for an open (material and immaterial) book of non-Cypriot history.

### *We, a singular-plural of denial*

We, the human inhabitants of Cyprus... Before addressing the extent of our humanity, we must take a closer look at this *we*. This indistinct pronoun, "we" as the "first person plural," represents the site of a fruitful tension between singularity and plurality, and the possibility of being simultaneously singular and plural. It is safe to suggest that, here in Cyprus, we have got so much used to the respective singularities of a comforting "we" and a threatening "they" that 'we have not even begun to discover what it is to be many' (Nancy, 2000: xiv). What is not very difficult to notice, however, is that this "we", whatever rigid form it might take and even when it is opposed to the most hateful hostility of a "they", is only possible through "being-with-them", that is, 'being-with-one-another' (xiv). Therefore, we, the human inhabitants of Cyprus, are not simply and solely Cypriots, Turks, Greeks, Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots. *We are whoever happens to be in Cyprus, at any time whatsoever.*

As originary accidents, that is, as the perfectly accidental inhabitants of this island, we can measure the truly immeasurable extent of our humanity thanks to the sentiment of the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy: We are humans, those beings 'who expose sharing and circulation as such by saying "we," by saying *we to themselves*' (3).<sup>1</sup> When we define humans as "sharing beings," we must always remember the secondary meanings of what is being "shared" preserved in the French equivalent of the word used by Nancy; *partagé*: 'the adjective *partagé* is used to describe, among other things, a requited love, a shared meal, and a divided country' (194).

We must open up the polysemy offered for our case. When we share Cyprus, we share not only the factuality of a divided country, but also the potentiality of a requited love or a shared meal. Nevertheless these rather pleasant images should not engrave on our minds the illusory semblance of a peaceful coexistence. After all, we know only too well that even a requited love is never free from pain and there is no such thing as a "free" shared meal. Someone has to pay for sharing and someone has to endure the pain of sharing, and we who share a divided island should not live in peace until we adequately account

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<sup>1</sup> Emphases are in the original text, unless otherwise stated.

for the war that unites us. Our common war is waged by our militarized existence. Our common debt is to a global capitalism that provides us our shared meals. And our common pain is inflicted by the histories that we repress.

At this point, we must take note of Roger Scruton's suggestion that 'we should distinguish two forms of the first person plural: the "we" of affirmation, and the "we" of denial' (Scruton in Beiner, 1999: 290). The "we" of affirmation is 'the principal way in which the community represents (or "imagines") itself as enduring through time' (290). We need only look around ourselves to see that Cyprus is crowded with affirmative "we"s. Transhistorical myths of rootedness not only construct the historically violent Turkish and Greek nationalisms which did not hesitate to create their respective Cypriot variants, but also nurture the generic notion of "Cypriotism" that is most adept to utilize a popular mix of demography and chrono-politics to detect and *affirm* the "pure Cypriot race" in space-time. The quest for any sort of political emancipation in Cyprus, therefore, must go hand in hand with the realization that we need to *deny* the affirmation of any "we" and analyze our common (not Cypriot-common, but worldly-common) deracination, our plural rootlessness in a world of politico-economic and logistic accidents. Hence, our need for 'a "we" of denial, which grows as the bond of membership [to Cyprus—mR] weakens' (291). In Scruton's words, the conception of a "we of denial" as opposed to a "we of affirmation" helps us realize that

[p]erhaps we do not have a right to this territory; perhaps our ancestors gained possession of it by unjust and cruel acts; perhaps there is nothing of value in the institutions that they have passed to us; perhaps law, religion, and morality as we know them are merely the masks for usurping power' (291).

This line of reasoning in the name of us who dare to deny ourselves the warm shelter of traditional nativism offers us the opportunity to tell our history as 'a "narrative in deconstruction," in which the whole story is told again as a story of crime' (291). In deconstructed history, we find ourselves moving inside a new kind of community, a community without identity which

[asserts] relations of obligation and responsibility between the living and the dead; asking us to bear the burden of our ancestors' misdeeds, and to recognize moral bonds for which we never contracted, toward victims who were no victims of ours' (291).

When we deny, we must deny the urge to live in peace with our criminal, "all-too-Cypriot" history and when we affirm, we must affirm the need to understand the worldliness of our concerns and demands. We must put this island in a cosmopolitan perspective, devoid of any localist fixation, and connect

the dots in order to see the outlines of the bigger picture in which a world forms Cyprus and in which Cyprus is nothing but a *microcosmopolis*, a site of world-forming.

### *Belonging to a world in Cyprus (against globalization)*

Belonging to a non-Cypriot history requires both belonging to the world and non-belonging to Cyprus insofar as we misconceive of Cyprus as an island whose problems are detached from the world and unique in its own space. We should not belong to Cyprus as long as we misrepresent it as disconnected from a 'process in expansion', from 'a space of meaning held in common' (Raffoul and Pettigrew in Nancy, 2007: 2). Nevertheless, belonging to the world does not suggest belonging to a 'globality as a "totality grasped as a whole" ', because the world is never an 'indistinct totality' (2). The idea of worldliness that we must formulate and expose to the singular space of Cyprus is diametrically opposed to the phenomenon of globalization. The dominant meaning of globalization today is an 'hyperbolic accumulation' of weapons and capital. This globalization destroys the world and becomes, ironically, an anti-worldliness (3). The world of worldliness, unlike the globe of globalization, 'divides itself and coexists: it is the movement, the agitation and general diversity of the worlds that make up the world (and unmake it as well)' (Nancy, 2000: 189). In this sense, belonging to a world against globalization and achieving this within the open space-time of Cyprus necessitates a conceptual renovation of our political thinking.

Nancy's concept of "ecotechnics" offers a good starting point in this regard. According to Nancy, the anti-world of globalization

has behind it all the effectiveness of what we call "planetary technology" and "world economy": the double sign of a single network of the reciprocity of causes and effects, of the circularity of ends and means. In fact, this network or order is what is without-end ... in terms of millions of dollars and yen, in terms of millions of therms, kilowatts, optical fibers, megabytes. If the world is a world today, then it is primarily a world according to this double sign ... [called] *ecotechnics* (133).

Put in somewhat more direct terms, ecotechnics is nothing other than the globality of militarism and capitalism which attain their perfect sense of coexistence in the phenomenon of war. The strong bond between war and technology is difficult to comprehend if 'war is generally considered a negative phenomenon, and technology a positive one' (Virilio and Lotringer, 1997: 30). However, as Paul Virilio suggests, we must cautiously observe the ways in which 'the positive phenomenon of technology [comes] in large part from the

arsenal and war economy' (30). We will have the chance to briefly discuss the notion of globalized militarist capitalism in relation to Cyprus and develop a notion of "permanent war in Cyprus" in the final section. For now, we must take the claim that the potential for belonging to a world is constantly undermined by militarist capitalism or ecotechnical war very seriously.

What is most important to realize is that belonging is always to *a* world, that is, an unspecified world which has no ascertained identity, because the 'world is excessive, exceeding the conditions of possibility of representation. ... The world is without foundation (without representation)' (Raffoul and Pettigrew in Nancy, 2007: 9). The world thereby exceeds its representation in Cyprus as well. Cyprus cannot open to a world, cannot appear in a world unless it becomes that space which enables us to take a new philosophical stance in favour of what the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls a state of '*ecstasy-belonging*', a state of '*Being-outside, and yet belonging*' (Agamben, 2005a: 35), i.e., belonging only by way of being-outside, belonging (to a world that includes Cyprus) through non-belonging (to Cyprus that excludes worldliness). If it is true that, '[a]bove all, the world is a place ... the place of a possible taking-place ... the place of any taking-place, the place where "there is room for everyone ..."' (Raffoul and Pettigrew in Nancy, 2007: 10), then Cyprus as a place cannot be understood except in terms of a taking-place in the world, continuously renewed, each time singular. *Cyprus happens singularly only in the plurality of a world*. Thus, belonging to a world through Cyprus can be achieved only by means of locating our Cypriot appearances in the global network of war and capital. Only the globalism of armed capital can show us our political existence in its true non-Cypriotness. There is nothing Cypriot about the globe which exploits us and nothing Cypriot about the world to which we must belong in order to critique and oppose ecotechnics.

Nancy's philosophy states that '[t]he facticity of the world is its abandonment, abandonment *by* and abandonment *to*' (Raffoul and Pettigrew in Nancy, 2007: 11). We are abandoned to Cyprus and Cyprus is abandoned to a world of potentialities abandoned by the globe of militarist capitalism. Moreover, the abandonment of the world is '*its poverty*' (11). Similarly, our abandonment in the world is our poverty and the abandonment of Cyprus to the globe is the Cypriot poverty. 'The world is never a possession, but an abandonment: the world *is poor*' (11). However, this poverty is never equal to '*misery*'; it is '*being-abandoned as such*'; poverty is the ultimate nothingness from which the world of humans arises; we have no reason to be here; we are '*coming from nothing, resting on nothing, going to nothing*' (11). This perspective of *abandonment in nothingness* gives rise to a new understanding of belonging. For so long, belonging has presupposed possession. The general tendency of "belonging so as

to possess" is still predominant in Cyprus so much so that whenever we belong to Cyprus, Cyprus immediately belongs to us as our possession.

That a sense of belonging must lead to a right to possession and appropriation is belied not only by Nancy's formulation of the originary poverty of belonging to a world, but also by our extensive exposure to the global operation of capital and our own historical wrongs committed against our own so-called ethnic siblings. Historical traumas of *intra*-ethnic political murders and crimes expose the bitter fact that possessing Cyprus as the "belonging" of a collective identity is possible only at the expense of banning undesirable political lives to a zone of non-belonging. Belonging to Cyprus is historically criminal because those who unproblematically belonged are —either active or passive, through execution or inaction— accomplices in the crimes of coercing certain others into certain sites of non-belonging, such as exile or, more simply and brutally, death. Belonging to a non-Cypriot history reveals those who could not or were not allowed to belong to a Cypriot history. These "non-belongers", murdered or mentally murdered by being forced into political silence, were expropriated from their own historical tasks. Their suppressed histories are sooner or later bound to remind us that we are deprived of any feeling of worldliness because we were not able or willing to provide them with even a minimal world (microcosmos) called Cyprus. Their non-existence imprinted as shadows on the dark pages of Cypriot historiographies can now be told as the story of a world turning with and dispossessed by the circuit of capital. After all,

capitalism (or any other name one wants to give the process that today dominates world history) [is] directed not only toward the expropriation of productive activity, but also and principally toward the alienation of language itself, of the very linguistic and communicative nature of humans, of that *logos* which one of Heraclitus's fragments identified as the Common.

[...] Even more than economic necessity and technological development, what drives the nations of the earth toward a single common destiny is the alienation from linguistic being, the uprooting of all peoples from their vital dwelling in language (Agamben, 2005b: 80).

What happened to the excluded Cypriots was precisely this uprooting of their historical existence from a vital dwelling in language. In terms of critical historical analysis, our impotentiality to (make Cyprus) belong to a "common" world of language (or, to the common language of a world) attests to our impotentiality to make the non-belongers feel at home in the shared microcosmopolis of Cyprus. Their tragic unhomeliness/worldlessness haunts the future of our history; the future of not solely our Cypriot history, but primarily our world history. The non-Cypriots are the members of a worldly deracination

that rips off our linguistic openness, that is, our limitless potential to tell all sorts of non-censorable stories, from our tongues. Capital, in its latest manifestation, feeds upon the destructive accumulation of the open communicability of humans and Cyprus as part of the globe is no less vulnerable to this.

### *Non-Cypriot: Human as infant*

History is not eternal / It is immediate / It taunts children / With what they will never achieve

'Sub-Cypriots' by Suzannah Mirghani (in Costello (ed.), 2005: 32)

This fragment from *Cypriot Identities: Conversations on Paper* edited by Karen B. Costello catches a glimpse of the meaning of being non-Cypriot which is a manifestation of being-in-the-world, being-singular-plural, being-with-one-another. Mirghani's suggestion of the immediacy of history is reminiscent of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka's claim that '[h]istory is life that no longer takes itself for granted' (Patočka, 1996: back cover). This can be interpreted as follows: History is not past. History encompasses the whole field of temporality. We are not at a mediated distance when confronting history. We are inside it, engulfed by it; we cannot ignore its haunting impact on our lives. However, acknowledging the immediacy of history is not enough. How does this ever-present history taunt children with what they will never achieve? Who are the children of Cyprus taunted by history?

If we take a closer look at Giorgio Agamben's philosophy of history, we see an interesting link between Mirghani's notion of "history taunting children with what they will never achieve" and Agamben's concept of "infancy" which, of course, indicates a metaphorical/philosophical interpretation of the period of early childhood in human life. In his *The Idea of Prose*, Agamben invites us to

imagine an infant ... so completely abandoned to its own state of infancy, and so little specialized and totipotent that it rejects any specific destiny and any determined environment in order to hold onto its immaturity and helplessness. ... The neotenic infant ... would find himself in the condition of being able to pay attention precisely to what has not been written, to somatic possibilities that are arbitrary and uncodified; in his infantile totipotency, he would be ecstatically overwhelmed, cast out of himself, not like other living beings into a specific adventure or environment, but for the first time into a *world*. He would truly be listening to being. His voice still free from any genetic prescription, and having absolutely nothing to say or express, sole animal of his kind, he could, like Adam, *name* things in his language. In naming, man is tied to infancy, he is forever linked to an openness that transcends every specific destiny and every genetic calling (Agamben, 1995: 96-7).

Infancy depicts a mode of existence that resists any communal incorporation and rejects any help from the world of adults who are well-identified, hence totally socialized people conforming to the determinations of hierarchical power. The infant knows no hierarchy, he knows only an-archy,<sup>2</sup> precisely because of his innate impotence.

In our historical environs, the concept of "Cypriot" as an identity (irrespective of its Turkishness or Greekness) has been representing the maturity that completely forgets the possibility of infancy. Our common, Cypriot historical language draws us into a web of "genetic prescription" and political "destiny". The problem with Cypriots is that they know *exactly* what to say or express. Their voice is so much automated that nothing remains un-named/un-namable on this island. This "mature closure" finds relief in the absolute knowledge of having been born in Cyprus to parents who were born in Cyprus, whose parents were also born in Cyprus, etc. As the number of generations linked by the chain of birth (a principal biopolitical referent) increases, the Cypriot can rest assured that his infancy has been abolished, that he is not a newcomer on this island, that there is a "genetic calling" which mesmerizes and binds him to a specific political destiny entailing a rightful claim to possess and rule Cyprus. This assurance is the reason why the unwritten history of Cypriots killing each other acquires such great importance. The written portion of this thanato-historical Cypriotism includes the bloodshed caused by the *inter-ethnic* conflicts between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, which has so far been used as the dominant historiographical intervention aimed at cancelling the uncategorizable, infantile, contingent modality of the non-Cypriot (as non-identity) that was violently swallowed by the more experienced, more "adult" identities of Turk and Greek.

The unwritten part of the Cypriot history, i.e., the unwritten history of the non-Cypriot, consists of more disturbing experiences. The non-Cypriot history mainly consists in a special kind of post-World-War-2 (post-WW2) violence, of the kind that Jacques Derrida generally defines as an '*autoimmunity process*'; 'that strange behaviour where a living being, in quasi-*suicidal* fashion, "itself" works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself *against* its "own" immunity' (Derrida in Borradori, 2003: 94). Put in more concrete terms: Whenever those political crimes in Cyprus that involve the threatening-torturing-murdering of

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<sup>2</sup> An-archy here means that which is 'without-rule', 'contingent' and 'undetermined,' 'as contrary to centralization and authority,' '... a tactical politics that seeks to disrupt power at certain nodal points of interconnecting networks ... [and] actions [as documented by George Woodcock] that might 'act like the stone precipitating an avalanche' (1986: p. 285)' (Curtis, 2001: 176-7).

Turkish Cypriots *by* Turkish Cypriots and the threatening-torturing-murdering of Greek Cypriots *by* Greek Cypriots are *named*, written down and remembered as history, there immediately, in a sudden spark, appears, in his radical infancy and astounding simplicity, the non-Cypriot. That both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot post-WW2 political structures produced the paramilitary sovereign machinations aimed at terrorizing their own so-called "kin" and coerced a considerable majority into conforming with this production of dispensable lives, hence ended up violating the so-called "purity" of their own identities by targeting the "impure" Cypriots shows that the geno-political claims of belonging to this island have been automatically delegitimized and eternally problematized due to the Cypriot unfolding of the twentieth-century militarist capitalism.

So, let's re-read Mirghani's lines: '[History] taunts children / With what they will never achieve'. The impossible task of the Cypriot history is to account for those infantile political subjects destroyed by the autoimmune identities of Turkish-and-Greek-Cypriotness. The patrimonial and censorer Cypriot history has two principal versions: 1- The Cypriot history that concentrates on the violence between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, determines the hormone-injected maturity of the infant Cypriot in reference to his Turkishness or Greekness, and thereby re-invites the political potential of a circulatory violence sustained by the fathering nationalisms. 2- The Cypriot history that concentrates on both *inter-ethnic* and *intra-ethnic* violence, cancels the Turkishness and Greekness of the infant Cypriot by making him desire patricide, creates the suspicious identity of the mature Cypriot through the memory of an imagined burden of Cypriot fratricide, and thereby ends up adopting the political potential of an escalatory violence directed against the potential suspects of non-Cypriotness, such as Turks, Greeks, non-Cypriot refugees and foreign migrants, etc. Both versions end up occupying the same dead spot, the dead spot of identity-violence. Therefore, the Cypriot history, a history whose subject is always an identity, taunts those children of Cyprus who have not been categorized under a proper identity with what they will never achieve, what they cannot actualize, what is their potential. The Cypriot history taunts the infants of Cyprus with the potentiality of abolishing the necessity of a political identity, the potentiality of seeking out "arbitrary" and "uncodified" political possibilities, being "ecstatically overwhelmed", being "cast out of themselves" not into a specified, determined "adventure" or "environment" of obsessive-compulsive violence, but into *a world*. In this world, the non-Cypriot will face the music of his historical failures, his political impotentiality only to accomplish a condition of "paying attention to what has not been written", paying attention to silenced names, definitions, and facts, to accomplish an exposure to listening that

nurtures itself with an interminable openness, and to accomplish the passion of political infancy. After all, '[i]t is only after a long and arduous frequenting of names, definitions, and facts that the spark is lit in the soul which, in enflaming it, marks the passage from passion to accomplishment' (Agamben in Deladurantaye, 2000: 3).

The non-Cypriot must hear out the undead voice of Ulus Baker, a thinker of de-territorialization and de-identification:

An assumption that is truly intolerable today is the idea that humans are wearing themselves out to possess a sense of belonging, an identity, a feeling of "we," however symbolic, that will comfort them. Nature does not create nations, peoples, or even races; it produces only individuals and these individuals find their collective sense of belonging only "afterwards". What is important, therefore, is the meaning of this "afterwards," not the feeling of belonging or identity itself (Baker, 2000: 188).<sup>3</sup>

We can and must measure the extent of our humanity (and this potential-task belongs to *each one of us* as individuals) only in the indeterminate openness of this "afterwards," deprived of an inhibiting sense of belonging and identity. Thus we can hear the true voice of the non-Cypriot only in the suspenseful silence of political infancy.

***History, potentiality, contingency:  
In defense of conspiracy thinking and the feeling of suspense***

Following the reflections of Giorgio Agamben, I would claim that history is an 'experiment without truth' (Agamben, 1999: 259). History involves an 'experience characterized by the disappearance of all relation to truth' (259-60). Therefore, my arguments concerning the potentiality of a non-Cypriot history do not aim at grasping the ascertained meaning of a true past. A rethinking of history requires experiments without truth precisely because in these experiments the concept of "truth" itself is put to the test, tried, and experimented with. The historical experimenter's tampering with the authority of the concept of "truth", his gaze towards the past looking for something more than, other than "truth" shows that history is not a science, simply because science requires experiments *with truth*. A scientific experiment must find a truth, a truth attesting to the existence or visibility of something, whereas a historical experiment, in the light of Agamben's philosophy, must be a search for the potentiality of the past, that is, the question of whether something

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<sup>3</sup> Translated from Turkish by mR.

simultaneously can be and cannot be, whether a past event actualized its "potentiality to be" alongside its "potentiality not to be", whether all we know as history could have been otherwise, whether it was and still is possible/potential for history to change, to be rearranged (261-2). All of this is to say that history is nothing but a matter of contingency. What is contingency, then? It is not mere dependence on chance or an invading mist of uncertainty, because no accident is purely coincidental. What we call "contingent" is 'something whose opposite could have happened in the very moment in which it happened' (262). In other words, contingency is an affirmation of human freedom in history. With a conception of history as contingency, what is seen as necessary, inevitable and unchangeable to the backward glance towards the past is rendered in the present optional, probable and changeable.

Therefore, to affirm the role of human freedom in history means to defend contingency in history against every determinate truth-claim. As Avicenna once suggested, 'those who deny contingency should be tortured until they admit that they could also have not been tortured' (Scotus in Agamben, 1999: 263). It is imperative that we interpret this ironic suggestion as a way of stressing the fact that cases of political crimes such as torture encapsulate and epitomize the radically contingent character of history. The historical truthfulness<sup>4</sup> of humans who are exposed to torture, threats or other forms of political violence is something that *can both be and not be* attained. The reason for this political-criminological contingency is that political crimes call for a history that effectuates not only an experiment *without truth* but also an experiment *with trauma*. Trauma belies truth. It sets a barrier against remembrance and when it does not, it always has the capacity to distort the factuality of the remembered past. This is precisely what has been experienced in the case of *intra-ethnic* violence in Cyprus. The subjects and witnesses of autoimmune terror are so overwhelmed with an irreparable political-emotional complexity that they often unintentionally become the narrators of contradictory stories that can, under fluctuating circumstances, criminalize, *or glorify, or disregard* the involvement of

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<sup>4</sup> By upholding the potentiality of historical "truthfulness" right after denouncing the authoritarian role of "truth" in history, my intention is to subvert Bernard Williams' emphasis on the uneasy tension 'between the pursuit of truthfulness and the doubt that there is (really) any truth to be found' (Williams, 2002: 2). That '[t]he desire for truthfulness drives a process of criticism which weakens the assurance that there is any secure or unqualifiedly stateable truth' (1) does not sound paradoxical at all when we consider the possibility that the concepts of truthfulness and truth are meaningful only in the existence of singularities (as opposed to identities). Singularity — that which is different in itself, not in contrast with something else — is 'freed from the false dilemma that obliges knowledge to choose between the ineffability of the individual [unsustainable truthfulness] and the intelligibility of the universal [dogmatic truth]' (Agamben, 2005b: 1).

certain unsavory political actors in certain deplorable, *or* acceptable, *or* negligible political events. Therefore, the only truly redeemable veracity of a history of criminal politics that caused irredeemable pain is to be sought in the factual yet conflicting statements of contingency in which this history is expressed as *that which can both be and not be*.

Contingency does not simply utter regret or misfortune in the sense that what did happen could also have not happened. It is first and foremost a modality that makes it possible for history to be told in a plurality of singular manners and thereby helps nurture a *feeling of suspense* towards the fundamentalist notions of truth that legitimize infallible sovereign authorities. This feeling of suspense sustained by a knowledge of historical contingency sheds light on the modus operandi of a non-Cypriot history: an approach that I choose to call the *radical conspiracy thinking*. In a non-Cypriot history empowered by conspiracy thinking and deprived of the Cypriot truths of identity thinking,<sup>5</sup> a state of suspense must preempt any dogmatic stance feeding off the closure of an indisputable truth and the confusing nature of what happened in the Cypriot history of intra-ethnic autoimmunity must be acknowledged and upheld. A critical and truthful history of Cyprus must take a prescriptive stance in favour of activating doubt in order to comprehend the anomalies which structure the truth of the stable and normal identities of the Cypriot crime story. My use of the word "suspense" simply takes its cue from the common feelings aroused by crime narratives, e.g. detective novels, thriller movies: anxiety, uncertainty, apprehension, suspicion. Contrary to the conventional conspiracy theories that, beyond a shadow of a doubt, know and categorize what is evil and who is enemy and envisage all-powerful entities that dominate every act and deed of freedom, the radical conspiracy thinking attempts to locate the conniving free agents within the determining plots of sovereign networks comprising state bureaucracies, imperial policies, militarist caprices, and capitalist intricacies. In a sense, the radical conspiracy thinking is basically critical theory with a special focus on detecting and judging political-criminal practices.

In the context of the Cypriot case, Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State between 1973 and 1977, is the paradigmatic figure who, because of his foreign policy record full of warmongering diplomatic twists, vindicates all by himself a conspiratorial reading of modern history not only in a Cypriot perspective, but also within a global Cold War framework. Here is the logistic

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<sup>5</sup> Theodor Adorno correctly observes that 'identarian [identity] thinking says what something comes under, what it exemplifies or represents, and what, accordingly, it is not itself' (Adorno, 1990: 149). Conversely, a non-Cypriot conspiracy thinking as "non-identity thinking" tries to grasp how complex, de-localized networks of power enforce the erasure of those singular expositions which represent for the sovereign Cypriot what is not itself.

personification of a nodal sovereign point that goes by the name of Kissinger and when pronounced exposes the linking of Cyprus with several other crime scenes of the ecotechnical network such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, and East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh); an exposition that brings to daylight the non-Cypriotness of Cyprus, that is, its being non-special, its simultaneous being-singular-as-Cyprus *and* being-plural-as-Cyprus-Vietnam-Cambodia-Chile-Bangladesh. This man was the mastermind who maintained supportive relationships with the militarist-fascist "Regime of the Colonels" in Greece, paved the way for the de facto dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus by watching silently, yet knowingly, the coup d'état organized by EOKA-B, caused the USA to become the first state to officially recognize the outrageously unjust Cypriot regime of bandits led by Nikos Sampson, and thereby conjured the Turkish military intervention. The task of we, the non-Cypriots, is to make the name "Kissinger" our common code for the entry into the domain of a liberating feeling of suspense and a political disposition of suspicion where we will evoke the sinister memory of an exemplary sovereign who knew how to invest militarist energies so as to accumulate capitalist earnings. Let "Kissinger" be the black magic word that we shall invoke until the stigmata of conspiracy on the historical chain of command that reach down to the Cypriot level of responsibility become completely visible. And let's remind ourselves constantly that whenever we utter "Kissinger" we are not symbolizing an omniscient, demonic presence outside our being-in-the-world, but exemplifying how a sovereign author can write down a destiny for us and entrust us with the willful task of forgetting our priceless potentiality of being humans as infants, as those singularities 'that cannot form a *societas* because they do not possess any identity to vindicate nor any bond of belonging for which to seek recognition' (Agamben, 2005b: 86). Let's say "Kissinger" and then shout out loud: "*We are the conspirators. We are responsible*"...

*Judging the past, incriminating the present:  
Contemporaneity, jurisprudence*

When George W. Bush, the former sovereign of the USA, was asked the question "how is history likely to judge your Iraq war?" and answered "History, we don't know, we'll all be dead," he was not being modest, imagining on behalf of his administration a future that has made peace with the emancipatory potential of an unpredictable history ("history, we don't know") to be created by justice-loving yet furious revolutionaries and speculating on the likelihood of a cosmopolitan multitude's tribunal that will read the death penalty verdict for

himself and his other sovereign companions ("we'll all be dead"). He was merely repeating the overrated opinion that history is not creative (potential), but already created (actual). To many sovereign interests around the globe for which the name "Bush" is a singular and exemplary representative, a notion of "future history" is an ineffective oxymoron and the idea of a "future history judging a present war" is absurd insofar as it is fictional. Even the possibility of "judging a past war in the light of a past history" is currently a frustrating impossibility for the trial of the paradigmatic name of "Kissinger" has not materialized yet.<sup>6</sup> In addition, the name "Bush" is emblematic with regard to *our* latest failure to connect with the network of our singular-plural condemnation to/by militarist capitalism (or ecotechnics, or Empire, or worldwide neoliberal household, or the New World Order, or what have you) because the absence of Iraq and Afghanistan from *our being-singular-plural-as-Cyprus-Vietnam-Cambodia-Chile-Bangladesh* is glaring for those with the (micro)cosmopolitan and infantile eyes to see. We are incriminated in the present by our Cypriot inactivity or irresponsibility in the face of the post-September-11 constellation of good-versus-evil, our Cypriot inability to grasp and tell the world that in the war on terror good is evil.<sup>7</sup> The lack of any noteworthy critical-political stance against the anabolic militarism and violent capitalism of Al-Qaeda and the Bush administration is our Cypriot shame. What else could be the reason behind our weird Obama festivals other than our cold, rational maturity striving to repress this shame? Our incapacity to understand the global spectacularity and connectivity of the context of post-9/11, to comprehend the powerful contingent fact that both the 9/11 attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (along with all the other urban avenues of modernity which have become the ultimate battlegrounds of identity) were attacks and wars *against us* bears witness to our impotentiality to discover the non-Cypriotness of our Cypriot historical violence and political crimes. The horrible *intra*-ethnic political crimes committed by the Turkish/Greek Cypriots against other Turkish/Greek Cypriots (against nullified-Turkish/Greek-Cypriots, non-Cypriots) are the common burden of a world which we do not have the courage to experience and inhabit through our irreparable non-belonging and irrevocable expropriation.

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<sup>6</sup> The recent history of Augusto Pinochet's arrest and trial shows the specific weaknesses of the ideal of universal jurisdiction.

<sup>7</sup> As stated by Nancy: 'If "September 11" has made one thing clear, it is this: the world is tearing itself apart along an intolerable division of wealth and power. ... [T]he world of what I call *ecotechnics* ... causes disparities or inequalities that openly violate its principles of equality and justice to seem intolerable' (Nancy, 2004: 108). In the war on terror, good is evil precisely because both generate wealth, misery, inequalities, and injustice and both fight within the hegemonic contours of militarist capitalism.

We have been abandoned to a time vacuum as if the year 1974 crystallized all we need to overcome. We must learn that 1996, the year of border violence, and 1997, the year of missiles, seen as perversions caused by 1974, are not temporal hieroglyphs that can provide direct access to the circumstances under which we have lost our past innocence. We were never innocent. Fixed points in time cannot capture the pervasiveness of our historical responsibilities, but the concept of "contemporaneity" can. The question of temporality —the question of the problematic and non-linear linkages of past, present, and future— is the primary question that a critical-judgmental history of political crimes should deal with. It is a question that always already belongs to contemporaneity, the being-with-one-another of past, present and future. That the potential-task of assuming responsibility for a *past* that we cannot easily reclaim persists in the *present* tense with the hope of redeeming a *future* from violence necessitates making our present and future political happiness and hope *contemporary* with our past desperation and sorrow. This impossible demand for conjoining bliss and sorrow, despair and hope pushes the Cypriots into a state of anxiety because they believe that in order to make peace with ourselves the bridge between the bad past and the good present/future must indefinitely collapse. Therefore, the real border in Cyprus is not geographical, geopolitical, but (con)temporal, chronopolitical. We cannot judge the past mainly because we cannot afford to experience the fear of being incriminated in the present, being incriminated for/by what was supposed to be left behind and buried in secret, deep. However, a truly international —'before, across, and beyond any national determination' (Derrida, 1994: 85)—, political-criminological outlook must defend the bridge of contemporaneity so that we can see that our shameful crimes were non-Cypriot, not because the Cypriots were not criminals (they were), but because they belonged to a *world* of political crimes. This belonging will ensure that, whenever a Cypriot is judged for his bloody past, his penalization will be of value as long as it serves as an example for the incrimination of present sovereign powers and puppets all around the world, as long as it inspires a cosmopolitan *jurisprudence* that will lay the groundwork for judging the global criminality inherent in militarist capitalism. And if the Cypriot understandably stands in awe and asks "Where is that criminality? I cannot see," the non-Cypriot will kindly reply: "We humans are not born with the backward glance of the historian, but with the forward stare of the jurispudent. Freedom assigns us the task of foreseeing (*prudent, prudens*) a law (*jus, juris*) that will judge the unprecedented. Our present world, stuck between past and future, has no precedent. Nor does its ever-present criminality..."

*Prolegomena on the crime story of militarist capitalism in Cyprus*

Our non-Cypriotness emerges only in the double gesture of breaking the hard shell of the perception of Cyprus as a thoroughly local and self-absorbed unit and breaking the deceiving spell of the ideology of Cypriotism which tantalizes the meek, fearsome hunger for a sense of belonging to a non-problematic, anti-humanist identity. What all forms of Cypriot identity thinking have never approached as an enabling political question was the question of the "international". The fragments of thought presented in this essay on the urgent topic of our need to belong to a non-Cypriot history must see to it that the virtue of non-Cypriotness ultimately resonates with Jacques Derrida's practical call for a "New International," which 'refers to a profound transformation, projected over a long term, of international law, of its concepts, and its field of intervention' against the 'crimes' of 'the law of the market, the "foreign debt," the inequality of techno-scientific, military, and economic development' (Derrida, 1994: 84-5). We need a new International in its strictly Marxist sense, because the violated Marxism of the pseudo-communist Cypriot leaders Talat and Christofias has forced us to repress in haste the simple fact that one of the most successful ideological tricks of capitalism is being performed in Cyprus: the presentation of *class* differences and reflexes as ethnic, cultural, even "oriental" divergences. The ugly specter of an insipid racist xenophobia haunts the Cypriot conceptual universe of identity and belonging. It needs to be exorcised with a disciplined critique of "Cyprus as a political-economic limbo," with an awareness that capital unites Cyprus and capital has no problem with either the current Cyprus problem or a prospective Cyprus solution. Hence, the first legitimate question: *Is Cyprus (whether the status quo persists or it becomes a federation, a unitary state, or two states) bound to be a united state(s) of capitalism?*

Moreover, it is time to realize that modern Cyprus has always been an experimental and contingent site for the implementation of a series of emergency regimes, exceptional states dictated by the logic of an international (micro-global) civil war. Here, the first ethical step to be taken by today's cosmopolitan Cypriot, who is, of course, the "non-Cypriot-to-be", is to ask questions using the terminology of Paul Virilio's analysis of war: If 'the Second World War never [legally] ended'<sup>8</sup> and there is 'no state of peace' in the world, but only 'Total Peace', that is, 'war pursued by other means' (Virilio and Lotringer, 1997: 30-1), only the "war=peace" formula of deterrence adopted by an 'a-national military

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<sup>8</sup> The radical conspiracy thinking encourages us to declare that the Cold War, too, never ended. Neither the 'nuclear bomb' (Virilio and Lotringer, 1997: 23), nor the 'a-national military class' (24), nor the 'war-machine' (25) have disappeared.

class' (24), then can we assume that the whole political space-time of Cyprus, even the "humpty dumpty" rhetoric of peace, is ruled by the logic of permanent war, 'Pure War, not the kind which is declared' (27), but the kind that requires war 'in its infinite preparation' (92), 'the total involvement of the economy in war—already beginning in peacetime' (17)? Is peace in Cyprus bound to be the ossification of militarist capitalism in Cyprus, because 'in an age of deterrence, the production of arms is already war' (91)? Does the persistence of the global war economy implicate an era of 'endo-colonization' in Cyprus, that is 'the colonization of one's own territory' that 'underdevelops one's own civilian economy' (95) and creates an ideological 'system in which military order dominates' (96) and humans 'don't recognize the militarized part of their identity' (26)? The second, by no means final, legitimate question: *Is Cyprus (whether the status quo persists or it becomes a federation, a unitary state, or two states) bound to be a united state(s) of pure war and endo-colonization?*

The crime story of militarist capitalism in Cyprus awaits its narrators...

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